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a b s t r a c t
Before the results of a scientiﬁc computer simulation are used for any purpose, it should be determined if
those results can be trusted. Answering that question of trust is the domain of scientiﬁc computer
simulation review. There is limited literature that focuses on simulation review, and most is speciﬁc to
the review of a particular type of simulation. This work is intended to provide a foundation for a
common understanding of simulation review. This is accomplished through three contributions. First,
scientiﬁc computer simulation review is formally deﬁned. This deﬁnition identiﬁes the scope of
simulation review and provides the boundaries of the review process. Second, maturity assessment
theory is developed. This development clariﬁes the concepts of maturity criteria, maturity assessment
sets, and maturity assessment frameworks, which are essential for performing simulation review. Finally,
simulation review is described as the application of a maturity assessment framework. This is illustrated
through evaluating a simulation review performed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In
making these contributions, this work provides a means for a more objective assessment of a
simulation’s trustworthiness and takes the next step in establishing scientiﬁc computer simulation
review as its own ﬁeld.
Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
The objective of every scientiﬁc computer simulation is the
same: to accurately predict some behavior of the physical uni-
verse. However, this alone does not make a simulation useful.
A simulation does not become useful until its results are inﬂuential
in some way. Typically, that inﬂuence is either in (a) a decision-
making process (i.e., inﬂuencing a decision being made) or
(b) knowledge of the physical universe (i.e., inﬂuencing a scien-
tist’s understanding). However, before the results of a simulation
should inﬂuence a decision or increase knowledge, an assessor
must determine if the results can be trusted for the simulation’s
intended purpose. That purpose could be something as trivial as
answering a homework question to something as crucial as
assuring the safe operation of a nuclear power plant. Determining
if the results of a simulation should be trusted for its intended
purpose is the focus of scientiﬁc computer simulation review.
This paper is based on the work by Kaizer [1] and has three
objectives: First, to deﬁne and develop the concept of scientiﬁc com-
puter simulation review; second, to develop a theoretical foundation
for concepts known as maturity assessment frameworks; and third, to
demonstrate how scientiﬁc computer simulation review is the
application of such a framework. Section 1 of this paper will provide
the deﬁnitions needed to understand scientiﬁc computer simulation
review, how it differs from other terms commonly used in the
Modeling and Simulation (M&S) community, and its history. Section
2 of this paper will develop the concept of a maturity assessment
framework and provide a list of characteristics that are needed for its
adaptation and improvement. Section 3 of this paper will explain how
all scientiﬁc computer simulation review can be understood as the
application of a maturity assessment framework. At the conclusion of
Section 3, a scientiﬁc computer simulation review performed at the U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) will be analyzed and
explained in terms of such a framework. By meeting these objectives,
it is hoped that practitioners of simulation review will better under-
stand scientiﬁc computer simulation review, will better understand
the role of maturity assessment frameworks in scientiﬁc computer
simulation review, and will be able to perform better reviews in the
future.
1.1. What is a scientiﬁc computer simulation
Like many communities, the terms of the M&S community take
on different shades of meaning depending upon who is speaking
to whom. Different authors can have distinctly different deﬁni-
tions for even the most basic terms like computer model or
simulation. To avoid potential confusion, this paper has chosen to
deﬁne all such terms. An attempt was made to choose deﬁnitions
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that would have broad agreement among the M&S community,
but at the very least the deﬁnitions will be apt for communicating
the ideas of this paper. To lay the foundations for these deﬁnitions,
it is appropriate that the ﬁrst word deﬁned should be model and
the next simulation.
There is a rather large variability in the deﬁnition of word
model. Some M&S texts, such as Maki and Thompson [2], do not
deﬁne the word model, but instead give examples of different
kinds of models (physical, theoretical, logical, and mathematical).
Other texts ﬁrst deﬁne a system and then state that a model is a
representation of a system [3–5]. These texts have deﬁnitions
similar to the deﬁnition put forward by the AIAA [6] where a
model is deﬁned as “a representation of a physical system or
process intended to enhance our ability to understand, predict, or
control its behavior”. While the AIAA’s deﬁnition is practical, it can
be argued that requiring all models to be representations of only
physical systems or process and also requiring models to have a
speciﬁc purpose (i.e., enhancing our ability to understand, predict,
or control its behavior) is unnecessarily restrictive. In their deﬁni-
tion, the U.S Department of Defense (DoD) [7] removed these
restrictions as they deﬁned a model as “a physical, mathematical,
or otherwise logical representation of a system, entity, phenom-
enon, or process”. Similar to AIAA’s deﬁnition, the DoD’s deﬁnition
is also practical, but by restricting the representations to only
those models that are physical, mathematical, or logical, this
deﬁnition neglects the theoretical models deﬁned by Maki and
Thompson [2].
While each of the above deﬁnitions has been used successfully
in practice, they are not in agreement with each other. It could be
argued that the difference is only semantics, but given the
complex nature of this topic, a semantically clear deﬁnition is
desired. Therefore, a deﬁnition for model was crafted such that any
representation that would be considered a model by the literature
[2–7] would also be considered a model by this deﬁnition. The
proposed deﬁnition is a slight modiﬁcation to that proposed by the
DoD. A Model is a representation of a system, entity, phenomenon,
or process.
There is also variability in the deﬁnition of the word simulation.
Neelamkavil [3] deﬁnes a simulation as “the process of imitating
important aspects of the behavior of the system”. It is important to
note that this deﬁnition is focusing on the purpose of a simulation.
Juxtaposed to this deﬁnition are those of the DoD [7] “A method
for implementing a model over time” and the AIAA [6] “The
exercise or use of a model”. These deﬁnitions are not focused on
the purpose of the simulation, but the composition of the simula-
tion itself. The proposed deﬁnition combines those of Neelamkavil
[3], the AIAA [6], and the deﬁnition for “model” given above.
A Simulation is the imitation of a behavior of a system, entity,
phenomenon or process through the exercise or use of a model.
The important distinction between “model” and “simulation” is
the difference between representation and imitation. A model is
the representation. It continually exists as a representation,
whether written down on paper, coded into a computer language,
or as a ﬁgment of someone’s imagination. A model can be
changed, but does not change by its own accord. On the other
hand, the simulation is the imitation of a behavior. The simulation
is the exercise of the model with certain inputs. The simulation
can be the calculation on the back of an envelope, the result of a
computer run, or what someone believes will happen. These
concepts are simple, but they form the necessary foundation for
more complex concepts, such as that of a scientiﬁc computer
simulation.
With the termsmodel and simulation deﬁned, modiﬁers such as
scientiﬁc and computer can now be discussed. The modiﬁer
scientiﬁc implies that the representation or imitation has to do
with something in the physical universe and how that something
behaves. Thus, a Scientiﬁc Model is a representation of a system,
entity, phenomenon, or process in the physical universe (e.g.,
using a string tied at one end to represent a sound wave). Likewise,
a Scientiﬁc Simulation is the imitation of a behavior of a system,
entity, phenomenon or process in the physical universe through
the exercise or use of a scientiﬁc model (e.g., moving the string to
imitate a sound wave hitting a wall).
The modiﬁer computer is more complicated. In general, compu-
ter models are a subset of mathematical models. Using concepts
presented in Maki and Thompson [2], a Mathematical Model is a
representation of a system, entity, phenomenon, or process using
mathematical concepts, symbols, and relations. Likewise, a Mathe-
matical Simulation is the imitation of a behavior of a system, entity,
phenomenon or process using mathematical concepts, symbols,
and relations through the exercise or use of a mathematical model.
Ideally, a mathematical model could be used directly, but this is
rarely the case. Generally, the mathematical model must be made
simpler in order for it to be used, because whatever is performing
the computation (i.e., the computer) is limited in what mathema-
tical processes it can perform. This re-making of the mathematical
model is the basis for deﬁning a computer model. A Computer
Model is a representation of a system, entity, phenomenon, or
process using limited mathematical concepts, symbols, and rela-
tions. It is important to note that this limitation is solely based on
the computational device chosen. Likewise, a Computer Simulation
is the imitation of a behavior of a system, entity, phenomenon or
process using limited mathematical concepts, symbols, and rela-
tions through the exercise or use of a computer model.
Using these deﬁnitions, a Scientiﬁc Computer Model is a repre-
sentation of a system, entity, phenomenon, or process in the
physical universe using limited mathematical concepts, symbols,
and relations. Likewise, a Scientiﬁc Computer Simulation is the
imitation of a behavior of a system, entity, phenomenon or process
in the physical universe using limited mathematical concepts,
symbols, and relations through the exercise or use of a scientiﬁc
computer model.
1.2. What is scientiﬁc computer simulation review
Scientiﬁc Computer Simulation Review is the process of analyz-
ing the supporting evidence and determining (1) how trustworthy
the results of a scientiﬁc computer simulation are, (2) how
trustworthy the results need to be for an intended purpose, and
based on this information, (3) if the speciﬁc simulation should be
trusted for the intended purpose. In most cases, an assessor will
perform an informal simulation review. That is, the assessor will
not follow any documented procedures or guidelines; instead the
assessor will review those areas of the simulation that he or she
believes are the most important. For example, a student perform-
ing a simulation for homework will not submit the results to a
professor until that student is satisﬁed that the results are
adequate, at least enough to receive a personally satisfactory
grade. In these cases of informal review, it is common to ﬁnd that
the analyst who performed the simulation and the assessor who
determined the simulation is trustworthy and adequate are the
same person.
While satisfactory for many situations, informal reviews are
based on personal-value criteria of the assessor, and those criteria
are entirely dependent on the assessor’s knowledge level and
experience. In certain situations, determining if the speciﬁc
simulation should be trusted for the intended purpose is deemed
too important a decision for one assessor to make alone, and a
formal review process is needed. While making a review more
formal certainly makes the review process more objective, it also
makes the process more expensive and organizations must deter-
mine if the need justiﬁes the expense.
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Typically, there are three factors that result in an organization
developing a formal process for scientiﬁc computer simulation
review:
(1) the organization is frequently inﬂuenced by the results of
complex scientiﬁc computer simulations,
(2) the consequences of trusting those results, if wrong, could cause
signiﬁcant adverse consequences such as damage to the organi-
zation or its reputation, loss of resources, loss of human lives,
harm to the environment, or damage to national security, and
(3) there are no practical, allowable, or affordable methods to
obtain experimental data in order to determine if the results of
those simulations are adequate for the intended purpose.
While many organizations are faced with the ﬁrst two chal-
lenges, they are often able to perform some experimental testing
to assess the trustworthiness of the simulation’s results (e.g., sea
trials, crash tests, sub-scale tests, and test ﬂights). Historically,
organizations such as the nuclear power, nuclear weapon, and
space industries have only been able to perform limited testing
and, therefore, had strong motivation to develop a formal simula-
tion review process. Interestingly, as the cost of experimental
testing increases, more organizations are faced with the inability
to perform the necessary testing, and are turning towards formal
scientiﬁc computer simulation review procedures for improved
conﬁdence in simulation results.
Some organizations implement formal scientiﬁc computer simu-
lation review through an accreditation or certiﬁcation process. As
deﬁned by the DoD [7], accreditation is the ofﬁcial certiﬁcation that
a model or simulation and its associated data are acceptable for use
for a speciﬁc purpose. As deﬁned by IEEE [8] certiﬁcation is a written
guarantee that a system or component complies with its speciﬁed
requirements and is acceptable for operational use.
As deﬁned above, accreditation (or certiﬁcation) is very similar to
the third step in the scientiﬁc computer simulation review process.
That is, for a simulation to be used, someone must decide that the
simulation can be trusted for its intended purpose. However, unlike
accreditation that can only be performed by an ofﬁcial who has been
given authority by an organization, the third step in the simulation
review process can be performed, in general, by anyone.
Accreditation (or certiﬁcation), as discussed by Oberkampf and
Roy [9], has a higher focus on the legal issues, control authority,
and liability. Therefore, there are a limited number of organiza-
tions who perform accreditation and a limited number of ofﬁcials
in those organizations who can accredit simulations. Conversely,
scientiﬁc computer simulation review is not focused on issues of
legality or concerned with a person’s status in an organization; it
is focused on the tasks performed during the review process. If an
individual is analyzing supporting evidence to determine (1) how
trustworthy the results of a scientiﬁc computer simulation are,
(2) how trustworthy the results need to be for an intended
purpose, and based on this information, (3) if the speciﬁc simula-
tion should be trusted for the intended purpose, then that
individual is performing simulation review.
1.3. History of scientiﬁc computer simulation review
One of the earliest publicly available documents describing a
formal review process was generated by the NRC in 1989, Code
Scaling, Applicability, and Uncertainty (CSAU) methodology [10].
CSAU was considered a landmark achievement in reactor safety and
was detailed in a special issue of Nuclear Engineering and Design
[11]. It is a methodology that was developed to help quantify the
uncertainty of complex scientiﬁc computer simulations and was
one of the ﬁrst documents that focused on simulations in a some-
what broader sense instead of focusing exclusively on what was
required to perform a single simulation for a speciﬁc scenario. CSAU
inﬂuenced many of the maturity assessment frameworks discussed
below and its impact is still seen in how the NRC performs
simulation review today [12,13].
Around the same time, modern concepts of Veriﬁcation, Vali-
dation, and Uncertainty Quantiﬁcation (VV&UQ) started to be
developed. VV&UQ are three important processes that are used
to perform scientiﬁc computer simulation review, and while there
are many important references in their history, there are six that
stand out as key references. The ﬁrst three key reference include
the standards published by AIAA in 1998 [6] and ASME in 2006
[14] and 2009 [15] that describe the general concepts and
procedures of V&V. The next two key references are the text books
published by Roache ([16,17]) that provide a background and
history to the subject and additional insight into the different
facets of the topics. The ﬁnal key reference stands out from others
because of the breath of the topics covered and its audience.
Oberkampf and Roy’s text [9] could be considered the ﬁrst text-
book in VV&UQ. First, it is one of the few books that address all
three topics of VV&UQ. Second, it discusses the history, deﬁnitions,
theory, and current practices of VV&UQ and attempts to bridge the
gaps between the topics. Finally, and most importantly, the book
was written to a general engineering audience. By taking a step
back, Oberkampf and Roy allow those outside of the ﬁeld to
quickly catch up with the current terminology and practices.
1.4. Introduction to maturity assessment frameworks
A component of scientiﬁc computer simulation review is a
process which generates supporting evidence that (1) helps deter-
mine how trustworthy the results of a scientiﬁc computer simulation
are, (2) how trustworthy the results need to be for an intended
purpose, and based on this information (3) if the speciﬁc simulation
should be trusted for the intended purpose. While VV&UQ are
certainly the most popular components, there are many other
components such as evaluating the level of documentation, expertise
of the analyst performing the simulation, and level of peer review.
For a description of many of these components, see Balci [18].
As in construction of a building, performing a simulation
review requires more than a collection of components; it requires
a blueprint. That blueprint, the plan for the review, is the maturity
assessment framework. A maturity assessment framework sepa-
rates the review into different focus areas, specifying what needs
to be assessed in each area and how it should be assessed. The goal
of the framework is guide an assessor in assessing the maturity of
different aspects of simulation in order to determine if the
simulation can be trusted for its intended purpose.
It is generally considered that the earliest maturity assessment
frameworks were the Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI)
[19] and the Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) [20]. Both these
frameworks started development in the 1980s, but were not devel-
oped speciﬁcally for scientiﬁc computer simulations. CMMI is focused
on helping organizations develop and monitor complex software
products. Similarly, TRL is focused on examining the maturity of
products and technologies and determining if they are ready to be
used by NASA or the DOD. While the basic structure and concepts
from these frameworks are useful, neither framework was found to
be especially conducive for scientiﬁc computer simulation review [9].
The need for frameworks speciﬁcally developed for scientiﬁc
computer simulations became apparent in the mid 2000s, ﬁrst by
Harmon and Youngblood [21,22] and Pilch et al. [23]. These early
frameworks lead to the development of the two main frameworks in
use today, the Predicative Capability Maturity Model (PCMM) [24,25]
developed at Sandia National Laboratories and a framework developed
by NASA [26]. For a further history of the development of maturity
assessment frameworks see Oberkampf and Roy [9].
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2. Development of maturity assessment theory
Maturity is a very familiar concept, but is deceptively complex
in its meaning. It is familiar because most people use words such
as “mature” and “immature” on an almost daily basis and are able
to communicate effectively with each other. However, it is also
deceptive because the underlying concept is much more complex
than the simple binary descriptors of “mature” and “immature”.
The declaration of maturity is the ﬁnal step in a logical process and
that process should be fully understood before it is used with
scientiﬁc computer simulations.
Maturity is a form of measurement. Formally, a measurement is
deﬁned as the assignment of a number to an object in a systematic
way as a means of representing properties of the object [27]. Using
this deﬁnition, a measurement can be understood as being made
up of four distinct measurement components:
(1) The object (e.g., a bolt)
(2) A property of the object (e.g., the length of a bolt)
(3) The systematic process used to generate the measurement
(e.g., using a ruler)
(4) The measurement itself (e.g., 3.2 cm)
Because maturity is a form of measurement, it too can be
understood as being made up of the same four distinct components.
These components are given different names, but each fulﬁlls the
same role as its corresponding measurement component:
(1) The Maturity Object is the object whose maturity is being
assessed. It is important to remember that any statements
about maturity are not statements in a vacuum; they must be
made in reference to the maturity object.
(2) The Maturity Attribute is the speciﬁc attribute of the maturity
object that is being assessed. It is important to remember that
any statements about maturity are not statements about an
entire object but about a speciﬁc attribute of that object. The
maturity attribute can be referred to as the maturity category
or maturity element.
(3) TheMaturity Assessment Set is the set of the maturity criteria of
a speciﬁc attribute of an object. These criteria are sorted such
that they are in order of least mature to most mature. Thus,
each criterion has a corresponding maturity level that identi-
ﬁes where that criterion falls in relation to the other criteria in
the speciﬁc assessment set.
(4) The Assessed Maturity Level is the maturity level a speciﬁc attribute
has obtained using a given maturity assessment set. Given a
speciﬁc object, information about a speciﬁc attribute of that object,
and a maturity assessment set, the assessed maturity level can be
obtained. The maturity level is the level of the criterion to which
the attribute of the object corresponds. If it corresponds to more
than one level, it is the highest level achieved.
Just as the length (a property) of a bolt (object) can be measured
using a ruler (systematic process) to obtain a value of 3.2 centimeters
(measurement), the maturity attribute (a property) of a maturity object
(object) can be measured using a maturity assessment set (systematic
process) to obtain the assessed maturity level (measurement).
2.1. Basic aspects of maturity assessment
Maturity Assessment is the act of using a speciﬁed maturity
assessment set to determine the achieved maturity level for a
speciﬁc maturity attribute of the given maturity object. Maturity
assessment can refer either to the assessment of a single attribute
using one assessment set or the assessment of multiple attributes of
the same object using a different assessment set for each attribute.
While the phrase “maturity assessment” may be unfamiliar, the
concept of maturity assessment is very familiar. Almost all decision-
making processes from deciding what movie to watch to what car
to purchase can be described in terms of maturity assessment.
Most maturity assessments are informal because their assess-
ment criteria are not formally deﬁned or captured in any fashion.
Such assessments are highly subjective as different individuals are
likely to use different criteria and reach different conclusions. To
enable a more objective assessment, maturity assessments can be
formalized by consciously deﬁning their assessment criteria in
some fashion. One such means of formalization is through a
maturity table. A Maturity Table is a table that contains the
maturity object, the maturity attribute, the maturity assessment
set, and the corresponding maturity level for each criterion in the
assessment set. An example of a maturity table is given in Table 1.
The maturity table (given in Table 1) is a means of representing
a maturity assessment set as well as capturing other important
details such as the maturity object and attribute. The maturity
assessment set is comprised of the seven rows of maturity criteria.
Each criterion is associated with a corresponding maturity level.
The assessment set can be used to assess the speciﬁc attribute of
the object also identiﬁed in the table. In this case, this assessment
set can be used to assess someone’s credit score.
Perhaps the largest misunderstanding about maturity assess-
ment stems from the confusion between ordinal, interval and ratio
scales. For a complete description of these scales, see Allen and Yen
[27]. The maturity scales used in both the NASA and PCMM
frameworks are ordinal maturity scales. An ordinal maturity scale
would assign higher maturity levels to objects that are more mature
in the attribute being assessed. However, such scales are not meant
to capture the magnitude of the difference in maturity between two
different levels. In other words, such scales are ordered or ranked
sets where the criteria in an assessment set has been ordered from
least to most mature (or vice versa). For such ordinal maturity
scales, there is no associated magnitude with each maturity level.
While each maturity level in a particular assessment set is usually
assigned a number, (1,2,3, etc.), it could also be assigned a letter (A,
B,C, etc.), a word (least mature, somewhat mature, very mature,
etc.) or any other set of symbols ( , , ❖, etc.). The assessment
criteria are arranged to indicate the order of increasing maturity,
but that arrangement does not convey any other information.
It is often convenient to represent maturity levels as numbers,
but this can easily lead to misunderstanding or misuse. Numbers
imply a ratio scale. That is 2 is twice as big as 1, 3 is half as big as 6,
and so on. However, if the maturity assessment framework uses an
ordinal scale, than an object with a maturity level of 4 is not twice
as mature as another object with a level 2. The object with a
maturity level of 4 is more mature than the object with a maturity
level of 2, but exactly how much more mature is not quantiﬁed.
2.2. Deﬁning maturity and maturity assessment frameworks
With the concept of maturity introduced, the components of
maturity deﬁned and the basic concepts of maturity assessment
Table 1
Example of a maturity table for ﬁnancial credit score.
Maturity object People
Maturity attribute Credit score
Maturity levels Maturity criteria
0 Credit score less than 500 or unknown
1 Credit score between 500 and 579
2 Credit score between 580 and 619
3 Credit score between 620and 659
4 Credit score between 660 and 699
5 Credit score between 700 and 759
6 Credit score between 760 and 850
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given, maturity itself can be deﬁned. We deﬁne maturity as
follows: Maturity is a measurement of rank of an attribute in the
spectrum from the very worst to the very best achievable values of
that attribute.
Maturity is a measurement of a single attribute of an object. It is
where that object’s attribute falls in the spectrum of all possible
values of that attribute. Usually we are not interested in the maturity
of a single attribute, but the maturity of many attributes that have
some common focus. This is the deﬁnition of a maturity assessment
framework. A Maturity Assessment Framework is a set of maturity
assessment sets, where each assessment set shares some common
focus. For example, the assessment set provided in Table 1 assesses a
person’s maturity in the attribute of “Credit Score”. Similar assess-
ment sets could be created to assess other attributes of a person’s
ﬁnances. Then these assessment sets could be combined into a single
maturity assessment framework, where each assessment set in that
framework focused on assessing a different attribute of a person’s
ﬁnancial maturity.
2.3. The characteristics of maturity
The creation of good maturity assessment frameworks is vital
for simulation review, but before the role of these frameworks can
be discussed (Section 3), further understanding of these frame-
works is required. The building blocks of every framework are the
individual maturity criteria. These criteria are ﬁrst grouped into
sets which are the maturity assessment sets. Then, these assess-
ment sets are grouped into a maturity assessment framework.
Thus, in order to understand the framework, the criteria and
assessment sets must also be well understood. To enable better
understanding, this subsection will deﬁne and discuss the differ-
ent characteristics of maturity criteria, maturity assessment sets,
and maturity assessment frameworks.
2.3.1. Characteristics of maturity criteria
The following are two characteristics of maturity criteria:
 Distinct Criterion—A criterion that is distinct from all other
criteria in a given assessment set. Such criteria do not overlap,
but have clear lines of distinction. For example, if an object
corresponds to multiple criteria in the same assessment, then
those overlapping criteria are not distinct from each other.
Criteria that are not distinct can cause confusion as to what
maturity level was actually obtained.
 Exact Criterion—A criterion whose deﬁnition requires no inter-
pretation. Criteria that are not exact introduce signiﬁcant
subjectivity into the assessment process.
2.3.2. Characteristics of maturity assessment sets
The characteristics of the maturity criteria (e.g., how distinct or
exact) also apply to the assessment set that contains those criteria.
However, there are other characteristics that are the result of the
combination of the criteria into an assessment set. The following
are ﬁve characteristics of maturity assessment sets:
 Complete Assessment Set—An assessment set whose criteria
correspond to all possible maturity objects. If there is one
member in the set of maturity objects that does not correspond
to at least one of the criteria in the assessment set, then that
assessment set is not complete. Assessment sets that are not
complete result in the inability to assess the maturity of certain
objects.
 Economical Assessment Set—An assessment set that can be
utilized at a relatively low cost. The cost of performing an
assessment will often be the main factor in deciding if the
assessment will be performed. The cost is driven by the time,
money, and resources needed to determine which of the
criteria in the maturity assessment set correspond to the
speciﬁc attribute of the given object. Assessment sets that are
not economical may never actually be used.
 Focused Assessment Set—An assessment set where each of the
criteria is directly related to the maturity attribute. This
characteristic is as much about the maturity attribute, as it is
the assessment criteria; a clearly deﬁned and focused attribute
will result in clearly deﬁned and focused criteria. Assessment
sets that are not focused will contain criteria that are unrelated
and uninformative to the attribute being assessed.
 Objective Assessment Set—An assessment set where two differ-
ent individuals given the same set and the same information
about an object’s attribute would determine the same maturity
level for that attribute. Assessments are performed by indivi-
duals who may have varying backgrounds, expertise, and
opinions. The result of a perfectly objective assessment would
not be inﬂuenced by the individual performing the assessment.
Conversely, the result of a perfectly subjective assessment
would be entirely based on the individual performing the
assessment. Assessment sets that are not objective will result
in an assessed maturity level that is highly variable and based
on the interpretation of the assessor.
 Well-Spaced Assessment Set—An assessment set where the
increase in maturity from one maturity level to the next is
approximately the same. As stated before, maturity levels are
an ordered set and have no scale of measurement. However,
the creator of the set should strive to make the qualitative
increases in maturity between levels approximately the same.
Assessment sets that are not well-spaced will cause confusion
as to the interpretation of the achieved maturity level.
2.3.3. Characteristics of maturity assessment frameworks
The characteristics of the maturity criteria and assessment sets
are also applied to any maturity assessment framework in which
those criteria and sets are contained. However, there are also
characteristics that are the result of the combination of these
assessment sets into a maturity assessment framework. The follow-
ing are two characteristics of maturity assessment frameworks:
 Independent Framework—A framework where the assessment
sets are independent from each other in the sense of information
content. Thus, the resulting level of one assessment would be
completely independent from the resulting level of another
assessment. Frameworks that are not independent are redun-
dant at the very least and depending on the level of dependence,
may result in assessed maturity levels with no clear meaning.
 Thorough Framework—A framework that has a clear focus which
has been completely captured by the attributes of the individual
assessment sets. In all but the simplest of cases, a framework is
never completely thorough as there are usually an inﬁnite
number of attributes that could be used to describe its focus.
Frameworks that are not thorough may mislead the assessor as
they are missing important attributes that should be assessed.
3. Application of a maturity assessment framework
The concepts deﬁned in Section 2 provide the theoretical
foundation for maturity assessment frameworks. In this section,
we will discuss the integral role of those frameworks in scientiﬁc
computer simulation review. As deﬁned in the introduction, scien-
tiﬁc computer simulation review is the process of determining
(1) how trustworthy the results of a scientiﬁc computer simulation
are, (2) how trustworthy the results need to be for an intended
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purpose, and (3) based on this information, determining if the
speciﬁc simulation should be trusted for the intended purpose. For
informal reviews, these three questions will be answered by an
assessor based on some personal-value criteria. However, in order
to make reviews more formal, a structured approach is needed to
answer these questions. That structured approach can be obtained
by applying a maturity assessment framework in four steps. These
Four Steps of Scientiﬁc Computer Simulation Review are given as
follows:
(1) Maturity Framework Development—The process of determining
which attributes should be assessed, generating the maturity
criteria, combining those criteria into an assessment stet, and
combining assessment sets into a framework.
(2) Maturity Requirements Selection—Using the framework devel-
oped above to select the minimum required maturity level of
each attribute for the intended purpose of the simulation’s
results.
(3) Maturity Simulation Assessment—Using the framework devel-
oped above to assess the achieved maturity level of each
attribute for the speciﬁc simulation.
(4) Maturity Judgment—Compare the Maturity Assessments from
step 3 with Maturity Requirements from step 2 to decide if the
simulation is adequate for the given use.
All simulation reviews, whether formal or informal, can be
understood as the execution of these four steps. While the
assessor may not use the words “maturity” or “maturity assess-
ment framework”, he or she is exercising this process. Addition-
ally, it is important to remember that the assessor’s role in the
process is integral to the process itself. An assessor develops the
framework, makes the requirements selection, assesses the simu-
lation, and makes the ﬁnal judgment. These may all be performed
by the same person or by different individuals; either way, the
assessor has a ﬁrst order impact on the results of the simulation
review process, and it is crucial for maturity assessment frame-
works to take this into account.
3.1. Maturity framework development
Maturity framework development is focused on generating the
various maturity assessment sets that will be used in the require-
ments selection, simulation assessment, and maturity judgment.
These assessment sets are typically generated from focusing on a
speciﬁc maturity attribute and determining the criteria of that
attribute, or focusing on a speciﬁc criterion and determining the
maturity attribute of that criterion and other criteria for that
determined attribute.
The generation of the framework is likely the hardest of the
four steps in the simulation review process. While this step can be
performed by an individual, it is often best performed by a
committee of experts. This results in a better framework, but at
an increased cost. Modifying an existing maturity assessment
framework instead of building a new one from scratch can make
this step more efﬁcient. Examples of existing frameworks are
PCMM [24] and NASA [26]. Along with these example frameworks,
the characteristics discussed in Section 2 should be considered
when generating a framework. These characteristics allow devel-
opers of such frameworks to evaluate their framework’s strengths
and weaknesses.
3.2. Maturity requirements selection
Maturity requirements selection is the process of selecting the
minimum required maturity level of each attribute in the given
framework for the intended purpose of the simulation’s results.
Selecting the minimum required level is usually a subjective
decision because the maturity levels in every framework are not
equivalent to speciﬁc levels of accuracy or reliability in the
simulation results. Stated differently, the minimum required level
relates to simulation maturity and completeness, but not a
guarantee of minimum accuracy of the simulation’s results. To
make this point more clearly, consider Table 1. The credit scores
associated with each of the maturity levels shown in Table 1 are a
measure of the credit worthiness of an individual, but these do not
necessarily correspond to what an individual will do in the future
on repaying a loan.
There are numerous considerations in selecting the minimum
required maturity level. Selecting a level too low may cause the
assessor to trust a simulation that should not be trusted. Because
the time and resources needed for a simulation to attain higher
levels of maturity can be signiﬁcant, selecting a level too high may
result in a waste of time and resources by achieving levels of
maturity that are unnecessary for the intended use of the simula-
tion. The following two recommendations can make this selection
easier. First, identify any levels that are unquestionably less than
adequate. Second, identify any levels that are unquestionably more
than adequate. These identiﬁcations should account for not only
an organizational perspective, but also from public and environ-
mental safety perspective. In most cases this will not completely
resolve the issue, but it should reduce the number of levels that
are being considered for the minimum required level.
It is important to note that this step is sequentially placed
before Maturity Level Assessment. That is, in order to avoid
conﬁrmation bias the minimum required maturity level for an
attribute is selected before the simulation's achieved maturity
level in that attribute is assessed. Typically, the individual or team
performing the simulation review has some vested interest in
either demonstrating the simulation should or should not be
trusted. One way to minimize any bias is by independently
performing each of the steps of simulation review. For example,
independent experts and decision makers who would use the
simulation results could select the minimum required maturity
levels, whereas individuals more familiar with the simulation
could assess the achieved maturity levels of the simulation.
3.3. Maturity simulation assessment
Maturity simulation assessment is the process of assessing the
maturity level of each attribute in the given framework for a
speciﬁc simulation. The assessor considers each assessment set in
the developed framework and determines the highest maturity
level the speciﬁc simulation has achieved.
The act of simulation assessment is not necessarily dependent
on the intended purpose of the simulation. That is, a simulation
could be assessed by an individual, even if that individual did not
know the intended use of the simulation. However, as assessments
are costly, the level of detail in the assessment is generally directly
dependent on the intended use of the simulation. For example, it is
not practical to spend millions of dollars to perform validation on a
computer code used for a homework problem, but one could.
Simulation review takes signiﬁcant time and resources and
generally this step consumes the most. Thus, simulation review is
not performed unless there is strong motivation to do so, motiva-
tion that can only be provided by the simulation’s intended
purpose. The simulation’s intended purpose affects the resources
available to perform the review that is reﬂected in the assessment
framework. Thus, the simulation assessment, while technically
independent of the intended purpose, will be assessed with a
framework that is directly dependent on the intended purpose due
to economic considerations. Should the simulation be considered
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for a different purpose, this step would likely be repeated, as the
maturity requirements would be changed.
Depending on the characteristics of the criteria and assessment
sets, this step can be much more objective than the requirements
selection. Assessing a simulation is capturing work that was
already performed to demonstrate that the simulation can be
trusted. The purpose of this step is not to determine if more
evidence in needed. Rather, the purpose of this step is to capture
the evidence that exists and present it in a manner such that an
assessor can determine if the simulation’s maturity has met the
minimum requirements.
3.4. Maturity judgment
Maturity judgment is the process of comparing the assessed
maturity levels and required maturity levels of each attribute in
the framework to reach a judgment as to whether or not the
simulation should be trusted. Rarely is this simply ensuring that
each attribute has achieved its minimum required level. Maturity
judgment may involve tradeoffs, changes to required levels, and
changes to assessed levels. There may be a justiﬁable reason for
performing each of these actions, but it may also be conﬁrmation
bias and caution is therefore suggested.
Tradeoffs occur when one speciﬁc attribute that fails to meet its
minimum required level is balanced out by another speciﬁc
attribute that exceeds its minimum required level. While possible,
such tradeoffs indicate that the framework does not have inde-
pendent assessment sets, which is a result from two attributes
being closely linked. At best, such tradeoffs introduce subjectivity
into the review process and at worst they are the result of
conﬁrmation bias. Tradeoffs are a change to the required maturity
levels and therefore should only be performed with extreme
caution and extensive justiﬁcation.
During the process of maturity judgment, it may become
apparent that the required level was determined incorrectly, or
the achieved level was assessed incorrectly. Again, there may be
defensible reasons for making such changes, but any change made
this late in the review process should be well documented and
highly scrutinized, as it may also be the result of conﬁrmation bias.
Any changes deemed appropriate should be used to update the
framework and ensure that such changes are not needed in the
future.
Ultimately, an assessor must form a judgment as to whether or
not the simulation is trustworthy (i.e., if the speciﬁc simulation
should be trusted for the intended purpose). Of all of the steps in
the simulation review process, this is the only step that has direct
consequences and therefore has the greatest impact. However, it is
generally the step least understood and least considered during
the creation of the maturity assessment framework. Typically,
frameworks will be created with a focus on the requirements
selection or simulation assessment, not with a focus on the actual
judgment of that simulation. Because maturity judgment is the
only step with direct consequences, it should be considered when
creating new frameworks.
4. Example of a scientiﬁc computer simulation review
The following section will walk through an example of scien-
tiﬁc computer simulation review as described by a maturity
assessment framework. This simulation review was performed at
the NRC for the VIPRE-01M computer code and documented in the
Safety Evaluation [28]. The assessor performing the review was
completely unaware of the terms of maturity and maturity
assessment frameworks at the time, and yet the review can be
understood as the application of such a framework.
4.1. Summary of the review
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. submitted a report “Thermal
Design Methodology” to the NRC for review and approval. The
purpose of this report was to justify the use of the VIPRE-01M
computer code for performing speciﬁc simulations. VIPRE-01M is a
subchannel computer code that simulates the thermal-hydraulic
behavior of a nuclear reactor. Given the general boundary condi-
tions of the core, VIPRE-01M can calculate the local ﬂuid condi-
tions in the core during a scenario. Once VIPRE-01M calculates the
local ﬂuid conditions, those conditions are used to determine the
ratio of current heat ﬂux to the critical heat ﬂux (i.e., the heat ﬂux
at which the fuel may no longer be adequately cooled). This ratio is
an important measure of safety for nuclear power plants.
The assessor performed the review using the guidance found in
the NRC’s Standard Review Plan for the Review of Transient and
Accident Analysis Methods [13]. This document was created to
guide the NRC staff in performing simulation reviews and contains
six broad categories of attributes (Documentation, Evaluation
Model, Accident Scenario Identiﬁcation Process, Code Assessment,
Uncertainty Analysis, and Quality Assurance Plan). The assessor
further separated each category into speciﬁc review criteria
resulting in forty distinct review criteria. Each of these criteria,
along with how they were satisﬁed, was documented in the
assessor's safety evaluation [28]. Because all review criteria were
either satisﬁed or did not apply, the VIPRE-01M computer code
was approved for performing the speciﬁc simulations.
4.2. Explanation of the review as the application of a maturity
assessment framework
The review reported in [28] can be explained as the application
of a maturity assessment framework. That is, even though the
assessor who performed the review and those who created the
guidance for the review were unfamiliar with the terms of
maturity and maturity assessment framework, they seemed to
be familiar with the concepts.
4.2.1. Maturity framework development
The forty review criteria can each be mapped to a maturity
attribute. Thus, this framework was made up of forty maturity
attributes each with their own assessment set. The following is an
example of one such attribute: The reviewers should also conﬁrm
that the theory manual identiﬁes the pedigree or origin of closure
relationships used in the code and the limits of applicability for all
models in the code.
Creating an assessment set that describes the possible maturity
levels of this attribute is trivial, as there are only two. Either this
statement is true and the criterion has been satisﬁed or this
statement is false and the criterion has not been satisﬁed. Since
the attribute and all criteria are known, a maturity table can be
generated and is given in Table 2.
Because the maturity assessment set described above contains
only two possible levels of maturity, it could be thought of as a
binary assessment set. Moreover, because all of the maturity
assessment sets created from the forty review criteria are binary
assessment sets, the framework described could be thought of as a
binary framework. Such binary frameworks are very good at
determining if some set of minimum requirements is met and
are very useful for regulatory bodies such as the NRC that focus on
establishing minimum acceptable standards.
To add further insight into the binary framework generated for
this review, the following is an evaluation of that framework using
the characteristics developed in Section 2.3:
Focusing on the criteria of the assessment sets:
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 The criteria were Distinct as they are logically disjoint.
 The criteria were not Exact as there was substantial room for
interpretation.
Focusing on the assessment sets themselves:
 The assessment sets were Complete as every simulation would
correspond to one of these criteria.
 The assessment sets were Economical to some extent, but the
cost of such a review is not trivial and is therefore only
performed on high consequence simulations.
 The assessment sets were somewhat Focused but could have
used a more detailed focus for many attributes.
 The assessment sets were not Objective as different reviewers
could make different determinations about the assessed matur-
ity level of the simulation.
 The assessment sets were Well-Spaced as there is a clear and
logical distinction in the increase of maturity from one level to
the other.
Focusing on the framework as a whole:
 The framework was Independent as the different attributes
were fairly independent from other attributes.
 The framework is Thorough as no major attribute seems to be
missing.
In summary, the framework has clear distinctions between
maturity levels; is applicable to a wide range of convective heat
transfer simulations; can be economically used for simulation
review; has a logical distinction between maturity levels; has
independent attributes; and seems to cover the breadth and depth
needed for simulation review. However, the framework is very
sensitive to the assessor performing the review, in terms of both
what details are considered and how it is determined that criteria
are satisﬁed. This is why the justiﬁcation for the assessor’s
conclusions is included in the safety evaluation.
It is important to note that while it took a signiﬁcant amount of
time to generate the review guidance for this review [13] and to
perform and document the review [28], it took little time to turn
this information into a maturity assessment framework and
evaluate that framework. The framework is not adding or sub-
tracting information from the review process; it is merely repre-
senting the information in a different way. By rearranging the
information into a maturity assessment framework, the assessor is
able to understand better what is being focused on in the review
and the information gained from evaluating the framework can be
used to make a better framework in the future.
4.2.2. Maturity requirements selection
One advantage of the binary framework is that the maturity
requirements selection is trivial as each attribute typically has a
required level of 1. In a few cases, some of the forty criteria given
in the guidance did not apply to the particular review, in which
cases the required level for those attributes would be 0.
4.2.3. Maturity simulation assessment
One disadvantage of the binary framework is that the maturity
simulation assessment is subjective. Because the maturity criteria
are not Exact, there is substantial room for interpretation and, in a
sense, the review is partially informal (i.e., not explicitly captured).
While the review criteria (i.e., maturity attributes) are explicitly
given, how it is determined that these review criteria could be
satisﬁed has not been explicitly given. For example, in the maturity
attribute given in Table 2, there is no criteria for what constitutes
an appropriate level of “identiﬁcation of pedigree”. Is simply
referencing a textbook or journal appropriate or is more in-
depth information required? Because the criterion did not specify
these details, the assessor had to provide some justiﬁcation as to
why he or she believed the criterion had been satisﬁed. The safety
evaluation [28] is comprised of all of the criteria considered and
why the assessor believed those criteria were satisﬁed, but
another assessor could reach a different conclusion.
4.2.4. Maturity judgment
One advantage of the binary framework is that the maturity
judgment is trivial, as every applicable attribute achieved its
required level of 1 or it did not. (Not all attributes were applicable,
and those that were not applicable could either be ignored or
thought to have a required level of 0). If any applicable attribute
failed to achieve a maturity level of 1, the simulation would not be
trusted. However, because each attribute did achieve its required
level, the simulations performed with VIPRE-01M were judged to
be trustworthy for their intended purpose.
5. Conclusions
Before the results of any simulation are used, the trustworthi-
ness of the simulation should be determined. Often, this determi-
nation is made by an individual or small group of assessors. Such a
process is generally subjective as it commonly relies solely on the
assessors’ experience and expertise. While experiments can provide
objective evidence of the accuracy or inaccuracy of the simulation,
the cost of experimental testing is increasing to such an extent that
many organizations are faced with the inability to perform the
necessary testing and must turn elsewhere to determine if the
simulation is trustworthy.
The work presented here identiﬁed the process of determining
the trustworthiness of a simulation as scientiﬁc computer simula-
tion review. The work further extended the theory of simulation
review by formally deﬁning it as: (1) determining how trust-
worthy the results of a scientiﬁc computer simulation are, (2) how
trustworthy the results need to be for an intended purpose, and
based on this information, (3) determining if the speciﬁc simula-
tion should be trusted for the intended purpose. This deﬁnition
identiﬁes the scope of simulation review and provides the bound-
aries of the review process.
In order to perform such a review, maturity assessment theory
was developed. This theory built on the familiar concept of
maturity and deﬁned new concepts such as the maturity assess-
ment framework. In the process of deﬁning a maturity assessment
Table 2
Example of a maturity table for simulations–documentation.
Maturity object Simulations–documentation
Maturity attribute The reviewers should also conﬁrm that the theory manual identiﬁes the pedigree or origin of closure relationships used in the code and
the limits of applicability for all models in the code
Maturity levels Maturity criteria
0 Not satisﬁed – OR – Do not know
1 Satisﬁed
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framework, multiple characteristics of the framework were iden-
tiﬁed. These characteristics can help evaluate the strengths and
weaknesses of a framework which is a crucial step for improving
existing frameworks and developing better frameworks in the
future.
With the development of maturity assessment theory, the
entire process of scientiﬁc computer simulation review was
deﬁnitively described through the application of a maturity
assessment framework. The fact that simulation review could be
described in this manner was illustrated by evaluating a formal
review performed by the U.S. NRC. It was demonstrated that a
maturity assessment framework was used in the review even
though the reviewer was unaware of having used one. Further, the
characteristics developed in Section 2.3 were able to provide an
evaluation of the framework. This evaluation brought to light
certain facts about the framework that could be used to update the
framework in the future.
Starting with the contributions made by the Boyack et al. [11],
the U.S NRC, [13], Pilch et al. [23], Oberkampf et al. [24], NASA [26],
and those of this paper, scientiﬁc computer simulation review has
been formalized from a nebulous process into an explicit
methodology.
The work presented in this paper allows for a more objective
evaluation of the review process itself and ultimately leads to a
more objective assessment of a simulation's trustworthiness. It is
hoped that this work will be used as a step in establishing
scientiﬁc computer simulation review as its own ﬁeld that will
enable its more rapid advancement.
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